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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

KENNETH J. WEBSTER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990764-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of wrongful appropriation, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998) (in Add. A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Were the out-of-court statements made by defendant's wife to a police officer
properly admitted under a residual hearsay exception, despite the wife's later invocation
of her marital testimonial privilege, when defendant knew of the State's intent to use the
statements and the statements had sufficient indicia of reliability under the Confrontation
Clause?

A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and its
determination typically will be disturbed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See
State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96, ^20, 989 P.2d 52; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah
1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. Larsen. 865
P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); State v. Drawn. 791 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah App. 1990).
The sufficiency of notice under the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule is
likewise reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown. 770 F.2d
768, 771 (9th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1036, 106 S. Ct. 603 (1985).
2. Did the trial court properly admit defendant's admission that he had previously
committed a similar offense when that admission was relevant to the material issues of
identity and intent, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice?
The appellate court reviews a decision to admit evidence of prior crimes, wrongs,
or acts under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, ^[18, 993
P.2d 837, cert, denied 120 S. Ct. 1181 (2000).
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to reduce defendant's conviction to an
infraction when defendant was convicted of third degree felony wrongful appropriation as
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1998)?
Determining the penalty for a crime is a question of law which this Court reviews
for correctness. State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to resolution
of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, including:
U.S. Const. Amend. VI (Add. G)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (Supp. 1997)
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (Add. G)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105 (1999)
Utah R. Evidence 402
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999)
Utah R. Evidence 403
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998)
Utah R. Evidence 404(b)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1999).
Utah R. Evidence 804(b)(3) (Add. F)
Utah R. Evidence 804(b)(5) (Add. F)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with theft of an operable motor vehicle, a
second degree felony (R. 1-2). The morning of trial, defense counsel filed three motions.
The first sought to permit defendant's wife to assert her constitutional right not to testify
against defendant (R. 22-23). The trial court took the matter under consideration and
revisited it before the State called its final witness at trial (R. 38: 38-39, 96-103).1
Defendant's wife in fact invoked her privilege during trial, and the trial court ruled that
her spontaneous pre-trial statements to a police officer when he informed her of
defendant's arrest were sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Utah Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3) and (b)(5) (R. 38:102-03).

'Citation herein to transcripts will be to the volume number stamped on the cover
of each transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 38:
7.
3

The second and third motions sought to exclude defendant's statement to the
arresting officer that he had previously stolen a car from a dealership lot in Virginia (R.
25-26). The court deferred ruling, opting to see how the evidence developed so that he
could properly balance probative value and prejudice (R. 38:45-46). Thereafter, the court
admitted the evidence, finding it to be relevant to intent, identity and absence of mistake
(R. 38:93).
Following a one-day trial, the jury acquitted defendant of theft and convicted him
of the lesser offense of wrongful appropriation (R. 34-35, 38:147). The court ordered a
presentence investigation report, and defendant sought clarification of the degree of the
offense (R. 37, 42-51, 53:5-13). The trial court found the offense to be a third degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1998), and sentenced defendant
to serve 180 days in jail (R. 55-56; 53:13-14). He suspended 165 days and imposed
eighteen months probation and a fine (R. 55-56). Defendant timely appealed (R. 60-61).
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
On June 22, 1998, Intermountain Volkswagen acquired a 1988 Nissan Stanza (R.
38:61, 71). The car was placed in a fenced area at the back of Intermountain's lot with
other trade-ins to be kept untouched until "bought by a bank and approved and funded"
(R. 38:62). Trade-ins were not driven by salesmen, as were the remaining cars on the lot,

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Kohl 2000 UT 35, n.l, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; State v. Chanev. 1999 UT App 309, Tf2,
989 P.2d 1091.
4

and were not used loi an\ icasoii O IDII,.. a llu.' 1 *. 111-1111 din Ik kmed an i|l
7!

?

)

38.65,

^ .tcind 11 Inmnlhlj inventoty of cars on July 3, 1998, showed the Nissan to be in

the fenced area (R. 38:73).
Defendant Kenneth J. Webster began work as a salesman 101 Intermountam
Volkswagen around June 14, IDDs (U ^MO

Otfiiidnil JIII In job thmif INN n weeks

after Waiting iitiiiiiil 1111 v *> (K. 38.63, 114). On approximately July 6 01 /,
Intermountain's lot coordinator, Mike McGuire, saw defendant drive the Nissan from the
lot but did not see him return (R. 38:75-79, 84) 3 I in 1111 % ID a dealership manage! dim*
to defendant's apartment to ask IIMMII Ik 1 n a il IMII unl IN < 11 n IHIIK <1 (1* \h 10 7-08).
\\< f 1 MIII 1 t!i« Ni. an in a paiking stall at defendant's apartment complex and notified
police (R. 38: 106-07).
Detective Michael Cupello verified that the Nissan was the missing car belonging
to Intermountain Volkswagen | k ^S 1IM OS) I i „ Ik 11 t nidi,, li il At It ntlant, NN ho ^aid IK
h u\ tin n fom In d 01 diiveii the tai (R. 38:108-09). Detective Cupello arrested
defendant, Mirandized him, and drove him to the police station (R. 38:110-12) As part
of the booking process, the officer asked defendant il lit had been ant sled heloit (II

While the supervisor testified at ditterent times that he saw defendant in the car
during the week of July 10 and that he saw him shortly after June 26, the jury was free to
believe the former testimony. State v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1994) (it is the
trier of fact's duty to assess credibility and weigh the evidence); State v. Vigil 840 P Id
788, 793 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied 857 P.2d 948 (1993). The facts must be viewed
on appeal in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Chaney, 1999 UT App 30^ *p
5

38:111).4 Defendant responded that he had been arrested in Virginia for driving a vehicle
off a dealership lot (R. 38:111-12).
Detective Cupello later called defendant's wife, Elsha Gallegos, to tell her of
defendant's arrest (R. 22; 38:112). He told Ms. Gallegos that the stolen car had been
found in their parking lot and that defendant denied having touched it (R. 38:112-13).
Ms. Gallegos responded, "He's lying" (R. 38:113). She explained that she and defendant
had both been driving the car, that she had been driving in the car with defendant just two
days earlier, and that he claimed that it was all right for him to have the car (R. 38:11314). She believed he had quit his job around July 8 and had taken the car back to the lot
(R. 38:114). When told by the detective that defendant denied driving the car, Ms.
Gallegos said, "We have a problem" (R. 38:114). The keys were never recovered (R. 38:
109).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Admission of the pre-trial statements of defendant's wife to police did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. The statements were admissible under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, thereby meeting the reliability requirements of the Confrontation
Clause. Alternatively, a review of the circumstances under which defendant's wife made

4

The arresting officer explained that he routinely asked this question because if an
accused has been booked in jail before, he would have certain identification numbers the
officer would need to have (R. 38:111).
6

the statements reveals sc\cttil p.iftu iilaii/od f?,uaraiid:es «>l liusl milhin.'ss lli.tl satish
Coir -M^' ^

<*\^ acquirements.

Admission of the statements did not violate the notice requirements of rule
804(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, because defendant knew before trial ol l he challenged
statements and the State':

' •'• *i

case h i\\ establisl les an.) entitlement to express advance notice of the exact evidentiary
rule under which the statements might ultimately be admitted.
Defendant did not preserve his claim that admitting h;
to police violated her ronsdliidniul injiii il.il lk'\hi!

.: ?e s pre-trial statemci r

u ,. i*

• • i r-- . -

claim a viola don ol'her constitutional right. Even if he were able to advance his claim on
appeal, it would be without merit because the State did not compel defendant's wife to
testify in contravention of the constitution.
Point I I 1 I he liial i m i l l | n n | K ' i k .tdiniilledi ilefiTidaiil' 1 i t i i k ' i n n i l that In had

pre\ ioi isl) takei i a cai from a dealership lot without authorization. The admission was
properly offered as being probative of the noncharacter issues of identity and intent,
which were both at issue at n i.ti
Nulb.taiiiidhilh i

I IK- mohaln e \ aiue .a UK- admission was not

d u i H i o l i \u Ihr iliiiit't'i n l ' m i d i i r p i c j i n l i t v f l i n r b y n u v d m * the

requirements of rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Defendant admitted committing the
prior offense, the crux of both crimes was identical, the evidence was unlikely to inflame
the jury, and the State's need f 01 tl le evidence on the issues ol identity and ml', nl n< as

7

•

obvious to the court as the State had put on the majority of its case before the Court
deemed the evidence admissible.
Point III: Because the offense of which he was convicted-wrongful
appropriation-was both defined by the code and not specifically designated an infraction,
defendant was not entitled to be sentenced for an infraction under Utah Code Ann. § 763-105(2) (1999). Further, because the jury convicted defendant of wrongful
appropriation, which requires proof of intent, defendant was not entitled to be sentenced
for "unauthorized control of motor vehicles," which has no similar intent requirement.
As defendant was exposed to a third degree felony conviction under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404.5(3)(a) when he committed the crime, the repeal of subsection (3)(e) prior to
sentencing did not change the potential punishment for defendant's crime, thereby
rendering his ex post facto argument meritless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT'S WIFE TO POLICE HAD
SUFFICIENT TRUSTWORTHINESS TO MEET
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIREMENTS; DEFENDANT
RECEIVED THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY RULE 804(B)(5);
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT A VIOLATION OF
HIS WIFE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND NO SUCH
VIOLATION OCCURRED ABSENT ANY COMPULSION TO
TESTIFY
Defendant argues that admission at trial of statements made by his wife to Officer
Cupello was error for three reasons: 1) the admission violated defendant's confrontation

right because tin Jatniimfs l;n kni llie HVfitiin! indicm of reliability;5 2) the State
allegedly failed to give defendant notice that it intended to rely on a residual hearsay
exception to admit the statements; and 3) the use of the statements violated his wife's
constitutional testimonial right, to defendant s detriment. Hi, mil Apll. .il ?M- \
A.

Backgrouncj

ancj

j'l-jal Court Ruling

Immediately prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking to allow his wife,
Elsha Gallegos, to invoke her right not to testify against her husband (R. 22-23). During
the resulting discussion, the prosecutor noted (li,11 lie |il.iiiin,il I<H all l\l , (iall^ju^ ih
ldiu'l.'illK ^

,(

i

" "i. mill isL'J Mi < ,;iI Irjjos if\Iir wanted to invoke her privilege

immediately or wait until called to decide whether to testify; she decided to wait (R.
38:38, 49-51). Before calling its last witness, the State revisited the issue, noting that it
had decided to ^. . '*; -. Gallegos to testify in its case ii i cl lief based oi I tl le defense's
opei ling state

'

•'• --

- •"!-<•- »os tlicn invoked the privilege, leaving the State

to seek admission of her pre-trial statements through the officer to whom she made them
(R. 38:96-103) The State offered the statements under rules 804(b)(3) (statement against
interest) and !b|<fc.|IUMJIIMI IK ars.t_s MIK'I (K 4S.C-><>-4->.', Kill HI |.

5

Defendant does not include a separate state constitutional argument under the
confrontation clause, so this Court may conduct a federal constitutional analysis only.
State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Dudley. 847 P 2d 424,
426 (Utah App. 1993).
9

The trial court found the statements to be admissible, noting that whether the
statements were against her interest or not, they met the criteria of rule 804(b)(5), Utah
Rules of Evidence:
It seems to me either they [the statements] are against her interest or they are of no
importance at all other than, for example, one might say, "Well, today it looks like
it might rain." They have no particular impact one way or the other. So I think for
that reason, there is a trustworthy attachment because they are by and large mere
statements of inconsequential events if taken in the context that you [defense
counsel] described.
(R. 38:102-03) (in Add. B). In other words, the court felt that, to the extent the
statements were against Ms. Gallegos' interest, they were admissible under rule
804(b)(3); to the extent they were not against her interest, they were admissible under rule
804(b)(5).6 The court further held that defendant received notice that the State would
seek admission of Ms. Gallegos' testimony, and thus, her prior statements, and that the
language of the rule did not require the prosecution to disclose in advance the exact rule
of evidence under which the testimony might be admitted (R. 38:103). Finally, the court

6

To the extent the lower court did not find the statements admissible under rule
804(b)(3), this Court may nevertheless affirm on that ground because (b)(3) was argued
below. See Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App.) (affirming
the grant of summary judgment on an alternative basis), cert, denied 939 P.2d 683 (1997);
see also State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (the appellate court
may affirm a trial court on any basis); see also State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah
1996), cert, denied 940 P.2d 1224 (1997); State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305 n.4, 989
P.2d 503 (the trial court may be affirmed on any proper basis).
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held I ha I admission nl fin; stahiifuiK iiiulu ,i irsidujl hearsay exception did not violate
defe* ia;
B.

^ onstitutional confrontation rights (R. 38:103). 7

The Statements Possessed Sufficient Indicia of Reliability to Meet
Confrontation Clause Requirements
Defendant does not claiiii llt.il flu stalettieriK wciv iidniillol in \ i AMu a ul rul<

804(111( »l I'uill

i, hr chiin^ a \ tulal ion of subsection (b)(5) only insofar as he allegedly

received no sufficient notice under the rule. See Point ID, infra. However, the fact that
he does not contest the ability of the statements to come in under these rules does not
settle the issue of their admissibilit)/ because w 1 letf ler ei defence n leets a hearsay exceptioi i
dot's i lot necessarily i neai i tl lat it meets the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, !.__ 12 (Utah 1989): see also United States v. Balano.
618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, 4<>8 U N I

I'"! M S ( (

30X1 (1<>S4); United States v. Sheets, i
l 'nn^equenlh „ I'1"'11'- < '• M• rl «,

INHIM

focus first on defendant's constitutional confrontation

rights.
To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the declarant must be

guarantees of trustworthiness." United States v. Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. 1529, 1536 (D.

7

Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court did not cite as a basis for its
admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements the prosecutor's assurances that Ms. Gallegos was
willing to reassert the statements for the court. Br. of Aplt. at 26.
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Utah 1994); Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249, 255 (Utah 1998); State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d
393, 452-53 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State v.
Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981) (adopting the safeguards established in Ohio v.
Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531,2539 (1980)). Here, defendant does not
challenge Ms. Gallegos' unavailability; nor could he as she was, in fact, unavailable when
she exercised her right not to testify against her husband. Utah Constit, art I, § 12; see
also Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(1) (a witness is unavailable when exempted from testifying on
the ground of a privilege). Cf Martinez v. Sullivan. 881 F.2d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 1989) (a
codefendant who invoked his right not to testify was "unavailable" for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause), cert, denied 493 U.S. 1029, 110 S. Ct. 740 (1990).
The trustworthiness prong is satisfied when the evidence falls within a "firmly
rooted" exception to the hearsay rule. United States v. Aldana. 4 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1327
(D. Utah 1998); Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. at 1536; Julian. 966 P.2d at 256; State v. Drawn.
791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah App. 1990). If the statements do not fall within a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception, this Court must look to the circumstances of the comments to
determine whether there is any indicia of reliability to support admission of the
statements. Aldana. 4 F.Supp. at 1327; Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. at 1536; Julian. 966 P.2d
at 256; Drawn 791 P.2d at 894. This review includes the totality of the circumstances
which '"surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief.'" Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. at 1536 (quoting Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S.
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805, 820, I 10 S ('( < I W, 31 ^ I l'' c "0, cert, dennu
(1995)).
Defendant erroneously claims that the general guarantees of trustworthiness are
absent from the challenged statements.8 Br r*f \p\. a*
The statements were admitted ui

*..,>,.%

•*-,>.

R uU1 K(M(h)( V| is mil A I'M mlv looted hearsay exception. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866
F.2d 1185, 1200 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds. 497 U.S. 227, 110 S. Ct.
2822(1990); Wemstock, 863 F.Supp. at 1536. Consequently, this Court lo* K \ he
circumstances surrounding t l - u^

. . . ..i.

„, . -

* innvN

of ti i istv < orthiness exist to si ipport the statements' admission. Weinstock, 863 F.Supp. at

8

To the extent he complains that he was unable to exercise his right to crossexamine Ms. Gallegos, the claim is without nlerit Cross-examination of the declarant is
not a prerequisite to the statement's admission under the Confrontation Clause. United
States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982) (introduction of defendant's wife's
grand jury testimony upheld despite no opportunity for cross-examination where the
requisite reliability was shown), cert, denied 461 U.S. 945, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983);
United States v. Marchini. 797 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), overruled on other
grounds. 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). Moreover, defendant has not established
that he was unable to examine his wife about the statements. Ms. Gallegos' exercise of
her marital testimonial privilege rendered her unavailable as a witness for the State.
However, that privilege does not extend to prevent her from testifying when called as a
witness by the defendant. See Engberg v. Meyer. 820 P.2d 70, 83-84 (Wy. 1991)
(defendant's claim that his wife's invocation of her marital testimonial privilege rendered
her unavailable to him at trial failed where he did not make any effort to call her as a
witness in his behalf in order to establish her unavailability to him). As defendant made
no effort to call her as a witness in his behalf, he cannot contend that he was unable to
examine her as to her statements.
13

1536. Those guarantees are present in this case when the challenged statements are
viewed under the circumstances surrounding their making.
Rule 804(b)(5) provides that the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. . . .
Following up on his investigation, Officer Cupello waited until defendant's wife
was off work the day he arrested defendant, then called her at home to tell her of her
husband's arrest (R. 38:112-13). Nothing suggests that Ms. Gallegos was forewarned
about the arrest or the possibility that she would be speaking to the arresting officer.
Accordingly, her responses to the officer's statements were spontaneous and wholly her
own. Further, nothing suggests that the officer was investigating Ms. Gallegos or that she
believed that she was a suspect in the crime, thus making her more likely to be candid
with the officer. When informed about the arrest and defendant's claim that he "never
touched the vehicle," Ms. Gallegos blurted, "He is lying" and went on to briefly explain
that she believed her husband had permission to drive the car, and that they had driven the
car until she got her husband to quit his job at Intermountain Volkswagen around July 8,
at which time she believed the car was returned to the dealership (R. 38:113-14). She was
very surprised to hear that it was discovered in her own parking lot (R. 38:114).
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These circumstances give rise to sever al pai ticular ized gi larantees of
tiuslworthiness

M,, (Jalloj-'os li.id personal 'knowledge of the matters about which she

spoke, and the matters were recent events. Hopkinson, 866 F.2d at 1201 This suggests
intimate familiarity and recall of the events. She stated that they drove the car until it was
returned, she believed, on Jul\ ;\ when tkiuiil.inl in In i leli hi-* job i Is 'IS'OV SO I \A).
Ms (iallegos s«ml slu- li.nl mil di i \ en the rat alter July 8. This is in keeping with the
other evidence of defendant's failure to appear at work, and the timing of the car's
disappearance.
Ms. Gallegos volunteered the statei i lei its, ai id
was mil ielliiH> tin IIIIIIL Hopkmsoru 866 P.2d at 1201. She was not required to make
any comment and was under no compulsion to discuss the details with the officer. The
exchange was not such that she reasonably would be motivated to divorce herself from
the car at her husband's expense

i heic ^ no i \ nlenc< ihii -II \\ \K ttiii«;t|i«ir<l u iili

ci i! i linal proseci ltioi I :>! < : tl lerwise made to feel a need to distance herself from the car.
Instead, it appears that she made the statements in a spontaneous discussion with the
officer, making it more likely that the statements accurately reflect the facts as she
remenibeietl I hem
Neither did she "absolve[] herself of all responsibility" for the offense, as
defendant claims. Br. of Aplt. at 20. She admitted that both she and defendant drove and
rode in the car in the days preceding her talk w ith I M'tu'cr Cupello, and she ie\ ealnl hu
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own knowledge that the car came from the dealership (R. 38:114). The fact that she did
not wholly exonerate herself from the situation suggests that she was being truthful in her
statements.
The mere fact that she implicates defendant does not render her statements either
unreliable or inadmissible. Br. of Aplt. at 22-24. Instead, careful review of the
circumstances surrounding her statements determines their admissibility. Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 115, 118, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1889 (1999) (while "accomplices'
confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant" are not perse admissible and must be
carefully reviewed, they are not necessarily incapable of qualifying for admission under a
hearsay exception); Lee v. Illinois. 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986). The
circumstances surrounding Ms. Gallegos' statements suggests that she did not have the
strong motivation to shift the entirety of the blame for the offense to the accused, as might
occur with accomplices or co-defendants. While she arguably could have been pursued
as an accomplice, nothing shows that she believed she would be or that the State took
steps to do so. Further, she did not seem anxious to inculpate her husband or to get him
in trouble, as evidenced by her refusal to testify. Consequently, her statements have an
added indicia of honesty or guarantee of trustworthiness under the circumstances.
Defendant contends that an officer's memory of a witness' oral statements
necessarily lacks trustworthiness because written witness statements to police have been
deemed to be unreliable. Br. of Aplt. at 24. In support, he cites to State v. BertuL 664
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P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983), which held that police reports of witness statements do not
satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. However, the case does not say
that such reports cannot meet other exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as the residual
hearsay exception. See id. at 1184 n.3. Thus, while such reports may lack the reliability
required for the business records exception, in the right case, the circumstances
surrounding the making of the report may well establish sufficient indicia of reliability to
qualify under the residual exception. Such is the case here, where the circumstances
establish sufficient indicia of reliability to permit admission of the statements under rule
804(b)(5).
Combined with the fact that the statements meet the additional specified
requirements of rule 804(b)(5), the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making
of the statements supplies sufficient indicia of reliability to weigh in favor of the
truthfulness of the statements and to support their admission.9

9

Rule 804(b)(5) requires additionally that the trial court find that:

. . . (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
The trial court held that these factors were all met in this case (R. 38:103), and defendant
does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 20-37. Hence, this Court may
accept as true the unchallenged finding as to these factors. Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy
Corp., 1999 UT App 355, f21, 993 P.2d 222 (accepting as true undisputed factual
findings); see also Hovle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah 1980) (accepting the trial
17

C.

Assuming a Confrontation Clause Violation, Any Error was Harmless
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Gallegos' statements lacked sufficient indicia of

reliability to meet Confrontation Clause concerns, reversal is not warranted as the
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van ArsdalL 475 U.S.
673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986) (concluding that confrontation clause error is
subject to harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
Aside from Ms. Gallegos' statements, the jury had before it other compelling
evidence which established defendant's guilt of wrongful appropriation of the vehicle.
Notwithstanding defendant's claim that he never touched the car, Mr. McGuire saw
defendant behind the wheel of the car the week it was discovered missing when he saw
him drive it off the dealership lot without any justification or authority (R. 38:76-78). No
one else was seen driving the car or had authority to do so. When defendant quit his job,
the car was still missing, only to be found within days at defendant's apartment complex
(R. 38:63, 73, 77, 80, 106-08). There is no evidence that anyone else living at that
complex had access to the Nissan. That defendant was the one to take the car and that he
did so intentionally is reinforced by defendant's own admission that he did the same thing
at another dealership in Virginia (R. 38:111-12).10 The only reasonable inference the jury
could draw from the above evidence is that defendant drove the car off the lot without
court's unassailed findings that parties were not indigent).
l0

See Point II, infra, for a discussion of the admissibility of this evidence.
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permission, took it to his apartment complex, and did not return it after he had quit his
job. This made out all the elements of wrongful appropriation independent of Ms.
Gallegos' statements. Accordingly, any error in the admission of those statements was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
D.

Defendant Received the Required Notice Under Rule 804(b)(5)
Defendant argues that the statements were erroneously admitted under rule

804(b)(5) because he received inadequate notice under the rule of the prosecutor's intent
to admit the evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 29-32. Defendant does not claim that he did not
know that the State anticipated using Ms. Gallegos' statements: the trial court found that
defendant knew sufficiently in advance of trial that the State wanted to call Ms. Gallegos
to the stand (R. 38:103), and defendant does not challenge that finding. Br. of Aplt. at 30.
Defendant even admits that he took steps to ensure that his wife would not testify,
including the filing of a pretrial motion seeking to ensure that she could invoke her
marital testimonial privilege. Br. of Aplt. at 30.
Instead, defendant claims that he lacked notice that the State anticipated using rule
804(b)(5) as the method by which it intended to admit the statements (R. 38:97-99). Br.
of Aplt. at 30, 32.
Rule 804(b)(5) provides that:
. . . a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
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meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
Defendant argues, without authority, that this language requires that he receive not only
notice of the statements and the State's intent to use them, but notice of the actual rule
under which the State will be seeking their admission (R. 38:97-99). Br. of Aplt. at 30,
32.
The analysis starts with the rule's plain language. "The fundamental rule of
statutory construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain
language. Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its
plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, Tfl 1, 992 P.2d 986 (citations omitted); see
also Kimball Condo. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648
(Utah 1997).
In this case, the rule speaks repeatedly in terms of "the statement": "the proponent
of it [the statement]" must make the statement known to the adverse party; there must be
"a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it [the statement]," there must be disclosure of an
"intention to offer the statement" as well as of "the particulars of it [the statement]." Utah
R. Evid.804(b)(5). Nothing on the face of the rule speaks in terms of disclosing the
particular evidentiary rule itself.
Neither does the case law suggest that such a requirement be read into the rule.
The State could find no case directly on point. However, the jurisdictions that have
addressed the notice language of rule 804(b)(5), the identical language of rule 803(24), or
20

other similar language have interpreted that language as requiring notice of the
proponent's intent to use the statements or notice of the statements themselves. See
generally State v. Tonev. 243 Neb. 237, 498 N.W.2d 544, 550-51 (1993) (under the
residual exception to the hearsay rule, requiring notice of the statement and its
prospective use); State v. Dillon. 191 W.Va 648, 447 S.E.2d 583, 594, 595 n.19 (1994)
(under rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), requiring disclosure of statement contents so the
opposing party can meet the evidence); Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc., 720
P.2d 880, 886 (Wyo. 1986) (requiring notice of use under a residual exception to the
hearsay rule). None have required notice of the actual rule under which the evidence
would be offered. This is consistent with the purpose of the notice requirement, which is
to afford the adverse party an opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness. See
United States v. Frazier, 678 F.Supp. 499, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
That defendant had an opportunity to meet the statement is evidenced by the
sequence of events below. Defendant knew before trial of the State's intent to use the
statements. Immediately prior to trial, defendant sought to have the declarant invoke her
spousal privilege, which she in fact did after trial began. The prosecutor, who appeared at
trial hoping to introduce the statements through the declarant herself, found herself unable
to proceed as planned once Ms. Gallegos refused to testify. The State was then required
to look at other means to admit the statement, which defendant anticipated inasmuch as he
admits that he reviewed and excluded the use of "other hearsay exceptions" in planning

21

his defense. Br. of Aplt. at 30-31. That defense counsel missed the residual hearsay
exception or miscalculated his ability to exclude the evidence under this exception does
not establish that he received inadequate notice of the statement or its intended use by the
State.11
As stated, the plain language of the rule does not require notice of the specific
evidentiary rule under which a statement will be offered, and it is clear from the record
that defendant had sufficient notice of the statements as well as the prosecutor's intent to
use them at trial to meet the notice requirements of rule 804(b)(5). Any failure of counsel
to succeed in excluding the statements does not stem from inadequate notice that they
were important to the State and does not establish that defendant was not prepared to
meet the challenged statements.
In light of the plain language of the rule, the trial court properly found that
defendant received adequate notice of the statements as required under rule 804(b)(5).
Defendant nevertheless claims prejudice, arguing that the lack of notice of the
specific rule prevented him from preparing to meet the statement and resulted in great
harm because admission of the statements necessarily required the jury to label both
defendant and his counsel liars. Br. of Aplt. at 31-32. Defendant fails, however, to

1

defendant does not explain why defense counsel apparently did not review the
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule or account for them in planning the defense.
Neither does defendant raise any claim of ineffective assistance with regard to his
counsel's trial preparation on this issue.
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acknowledge that the jury was free to believe or disbelieve the officer's rendition of the
statements. Mere admission of the statements does not establish the credibility of the
respective witnesses.
Defendant also overemphasizes the importance of the statements at trial, claiming
that they alone established the essential elements of wrongful appropriation. Br. of Aplt.
at 31. However, in addition to Ms. Gallegos' statements, the jury had before it
defendant's claim that he never touched the car, Mr. Maguire's testimony that he saw
defendant drive the car off the lot during the first week of July without authority or
justification, the fact that the car was parked at defendant's complex, as well as proof of
defendant's identity and intent through his admission of having committed the same act
before. See Point IB, supra. In short, there was no reasonable probability that defendant
would have been acquitted had the statements not been admitted. Consequently,
defendant's claim of prejudice is without merit.
E.

Defendant Waived his Claim that his Wife's Marital Testimonial Privilege
was Violated; Defendant Lacks Standing to Assert the Violation: Moreover,
There was no Such Violation
Defendant claims that the admission of his wife's statements amounted to a

constitutional violation because the statements were the "functional equivalent" of
testimony by one spouse against another in violation of Utah Constitution, Article I,
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section 12, which provides that "a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife."12 His argument fails on three bases.
First, defendant failed to raise the issue below and does not mention plain error or
exceptional circumstances. Consequently, he cannot assert it as a basis of error on appeal,
even though it involves a constitutional right. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922
n.3 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990).
Second, to the extent any constitutional violation occurred, it would have been a
violation of Ms. Gallegos' right not to testify, as the privilege mns to the declarant spouse
and not to the accused spouse. Defendant cannot invoke his wife's marital testimonial
privilege. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997) (the privilege may be
invoked only by the witness spouse). Neither can he assert his wife's constitutional rights
or a violation thereof. See Jackson v. State, 498 F.Supp. 186, 190 (D. S.C. 1979)
("constitutional rights are personal" and a husband has "no standing to assert his wife's
rights"); State v. Brewer, 732 P.2d 780, 783 (Kan. 1980). Accordingly, defendant is
without standing to assert this claim on appeal. See Wright v. Carver, 886 P.2d 58, 60
(Utah 1994) (accused has no standing to challenge the trial court's dismissal of a
complaint against another person); see generally Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789
(Utah) (third-party standing rule requires litigants to assert their own legal rights and does

12

Defendant does not assert a claim under rule 502(a), Utah Rules of Evidence,
involving the same marital testimonial privilege.
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not allow them to claim relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties), cert, denied
506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992); State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah
1987) (absent claimed right to possession, defendant had no standing to object to search
of third party's car).
Third, the State did not violate Ms. Gallegos' constitutional right not to testify
against her spouse because the State did not compel Ms. Gallegos to testify, as is
forbidden by the state constitution.
The text of the constitutional marital testimonial privilege is identical to rule
502(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, is plain and unambiguous, and deals only with compelled
testimony of one spouse against the other:13
. . . The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Const, art I, § 12; Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1228. Accordingly, interpretations of the
rule apply equally to interpretations of the constitutional right.
The state constitutional marital testimonial privilege is a limited privilege that does
not extend beyond the witness stand. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 638 (Utah), cert.
denied 516 U.S. 858, 116 S. Ct 163 (1995). It does not prevent admissibility or use of

13

In contrast, rule 502(b) deals with the marital communication privilege, which is
designed to protect "confidential communications" between spouses only and can be
asserted by either spouse. Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 806-07 (Utah 1999); Robertson,
932 P.2d at 1228. Defendant presents a constitutional argument only, and has not
challenged the communication privilege provided by the rule.
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everything a spouse might say. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45, 49-50, 52-53,
100 S. Ct. 906, 911 (1980) (noting that the Model Code of Evidence expressly rejects
allowing defendant to claim the privilege against all adverse testimony given by his wife);
Carter, 888 P.2d at 638-39 (agreeing with Trammel and noting that the police may
actively use spousal statements in their investigation). "It is only the spouse's testimony
in the courtroom that is prohibited." Carter, 888 P.2d at 638-39. When the spouse
voluntarily speaks to police and was not forced to take the stand in person or by way of
sworn documentation, the marital privilege is not violated. IdL, at 639. Cf, Doe v. Maret
984 P.2d 980, 986-87 (Utah 1999) (the marital communication privilege can be waived
through "voluntary disclosures"); ajso State v. Newman, 680 P.2d 257, 263 (Kan. 1984)
(statements made within hearing of a third person are not covered by marital
communication privilege); State v. Teel, 712 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. App. 1985) (same).
Prosecutorial use of Ms. Gallegos' out-of-court comments to police does not undermine
the marital relationship any more than in-court testimony from a third person as to
statements overheard between spouses, which testimony is admissible at trial. Newman,
680P.2dat263.
In this case, Ms. Gallegos was not compelled to testify. Once she invoked her
marital testimonial privilege, it was scrupulously honored and she was not required to
take the stand against her spouse. She did not submit her statements under oath, submit to
cross-examination, or provide sworn documentation of her statements. Moreover, she
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was not compelled to speak to the police. Defendant has not claimed that her statements
were anything other than voluntary, although he impugns her motive for making them.
The jury was free to reject Ms. Gallegos' statements in their entirety.
Ms. Gallegos' pre-trial statements to the police were therefore admissible,
notwithstanding her right to claim a marital testimonial privilege. Hence, even assuming
defendant were in a position to assert a violation of his wife's constitutional testimonial
privilege, no such violation occurred in this case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S
ADMISSION OF PRIOR SIMILAR CONDUCT UNDER RULE 404(B) AS
IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE MATERIAL ISSUES OF IDENTITY AND
INTENT AND ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
OUTWEIGHED BY A POTENTIAL FOR UNFAIR PREJUDICE
Defendant challenges the trial court's decision to let the jury hear that he admitted
to committing a similar crime once before. While being taken to the police station after
being arrested and Mirandized. defendant was asked if he had been arrested before (R.
38:111). Defendant stated that he had been arrested in Virginia because he had driven a
car off a dealership lot (R. 38:111-12, 131, 137). The State introduced defendant's
statement through the arresting officer at trial (R. 38:111-12).14

14

As suggested by the prosecutor below, the statement concerning defendant's
earlier arrest was admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), because it qualifies
as a nonhearsay admission by a party-opponent (R. 38:40). State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d
1161, 1164 (Utah 1980) (an out-of-court statement made by a criminal defendant that
constitutes an admission is admissible under rule 801(d)(2)).
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Defendant argues that the trial court's admission of this statement violates Utah
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which addresses the admission of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, and bad acts.15 Br. of Aplt. at 37-42. He contends that such evidence was too
remote, had no bearing on identity, intent or absence of mistake, and carried a potential
for unfair prejudice which outweighed any possible probative value. Id Defendant's
analysis, however, is flawed.
Before evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court
must determine:
(1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose
under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and
(3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403.
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,1J20, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), cert, denied 120 S. Ct.
1181 (2000). The trial court's decision is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.
IdL at^jl8.
The trial court determined that in light of defense counsel's opening statement
stressing that the State would not be able to prove identity, the challenged statement was

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
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"relevant and probative," and was more probative than prejudicial (R. 38:93-94) (in Add.
C). While the court did not articulate a detailed map of its analysis, the analysis is readily
ascertainable from the record.
The first part of the rule 404(b) analysis requires that the evidence be offered for a
proper, noncharacter purpose. Decorso, at ffi[20-21. The prosecutor offered it in this case
to establish identity, intent, and absence of mistake, all of which were at issue (R. 38:9193). Defendant's brief opening statement below emphasized the defense strategy of
stressing that no direct evidence put defendant in or near the car during the time it was
found to be missing (R. 38:58-59). His closing statement followed suit (R. 38:136-37).
He also argued in closing that the evidence did not suggest the appropriate intent, and that
the possibility existed that defendant was framed (R. 38:137-38, 140-41). Clearly, both
identity and intent were at issue below.
Little was offered below by either party regarding the specifics of the Virginia
offense.16 However, the trial judge knew that the basic crime paralleled the crime at
hand-driving a car off a dealership lot without authorization. He also knew that the
admission of the Virginia offense came from defendant himself, so that the jury was not
left in a position of deciding whether defendant had committed the prior offense before
using it to determine the issues of identity and intent in this case. See Decorso, at ^27

16

No one below identified for the trial court the specific details of the Virginia
offense, and defendant has not claimed his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not
doing so.
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(where the jury was required to decide whether defendant had participated in both the
charged and the prior offense ).
Because both identity and intent were at issue below, and the evidence was
relevant to these points, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that
defendant's admission to the Virginia offense was offered for a proper noncharacter
purpose.
The second part of the analysis requires a determination that the evidence meets
the requirements of rule 402, which requires that evidence be relevant.17 Decorso, at
lfl|20, 22. Evidence is relevant when it is probative of a material fact to the crime
charged. Decorso, at ^[28. Both identity and intent were material and controverted issues
at trial, as evidenced by defendant's opening and closing remarks, and the State was
entitled to establish evidence relating thereto. That defendant admitted to having
previously committed the same type of offense is probative of identity and intent because
the offenses were committed in a similar manner-driving someone else's vehicle from a
car dealership lot-and because the evidence is in the form of an admission of
responsibility by defendant. Hence, the evidence met the relevancy test of rule 402.

l7

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, reads:

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
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The final part of the analysis requires that the court conduct the balancing test
articulated in rule 403. That rule provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). The trial court acted within its discretion in
determining that the evidence of the Virginia offense met the requirements of rule 403.
In making such a determination, several factors may be considered, including "the
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, (Utah
1998).
The mere fact that the trial court did not, on the record, specifically walk through
each factor does not mean that the factors were not duly considered. Several factors are
readily apparent from the record. For example, the strength of the evidence that the other
crime was committed came from the fact that it was defendant himself who admitted the
criminal conduct (R. 38:111-12). Also readily apparent is a basic similarity between the
offenses-both involved cars being driven off a dealership lot without authority. Whatever
other similarities might or might not exist between the offenses, this basic similarity was
obvious and was the crux of both crimes. Further, defendant himself recognizes the
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strength of "the similarities" between the facts below and the Virginia offense, and notes
that the latter offense was a "near[ly] identical crime" to the current one. Br. of Aplt. at
41.
The State's need for the evidence is also readily apparent. Intent is not readily
susceptible to direct evidence, and defendant made it perfectly clear below that he would
highlight to the jury the minimal evidence of identity he thought the State would adduce
(R. 38:58-59). Defendant did his best to limit the State's identity evidence, making
motions immediately prior to trial to exclude his own statement as well as his wife's
testimony, which reflected on both identity and intent (R.22-28; 38:38-51). By the time
the court decided to admit the challenged statement, the State had already put on the
majority of its case, giving the court some idea of the State's evidence, or lack thereof, on
these issues and the low efficacy of alternative proof.
Moreover, hearing that defendant admitted to driving a vehicle off a dealership lot
is not the sort of evidence which is likely to inflame the jury or to "rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility." Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296. It is not a crime of passion, physical
injury or extreme emotion, and there was no suggestion that defendant acted maliciously
or damaged the vehicle he took. Further, the absence of surrounding details sanitizes the
offense.
Additionally, the jury was unlikely to convict defendant in order to punish him for
having committed the Virginia offense where defendant admitted that he had already been
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caught in Virginia (R. 38:111-12). Further, there was other evidence suggestive of
identity and intent before the jury, minimizing whatever prejudicial effect admission of
this evidence may have generated. See Point IB, supra.
Defendant contends that once his wife's statements were admitted, identity, intent
and absence of mistake were no longer at issue. Br. of Aplt. at 38. However, defendant
placed identity and intent at issue from the moment he made his opening statement,
thereby putting the State to its burden of adducing sufficient evidence to establish each
element. He went on to argue both issues in his closing remarks, notwithstanding
admission of his wife's statements. Further, his wife's statements were not conclusive of
identity and intent when the trier of fact is entitled to reject the testimony, if it so desires.
State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1994) (it is the trier of fact's duty to assess
credibility and weigh the evidence). Finally, defendant calls "identity" and "intent to
deprive" "critical elements of the offense." Br. of Aplt. at 31. Accordingly, his claims
that these points were no longer at issue is incredible.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's
statement that he committed a similar crime where the statement was offered for the
proper, noncharacter purpose of establishing identity and intent, and it met the
requirements of rules 402 and 403. Decorso, at ffl[20-35.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED OF AN INFRACTION
BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND HIM GUILTY OF AN OFFENSE
"DEFINED WITHIN THE CODE"; NEITHER WAS HE ENTITLED
TO BE SENTENCED FOR THE LESSER OFFENSE OF
"UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL" WHERE THE JURY CONVICTED
HIM OF THE GREATER OFFENSE OF WRONGFUL
APPROPRIATION
Defendant claims that he was entitled to be convicted of an infraction or a
misdemeanor, not a third degree felony. Br. of Aplt. at 42-45. He argues that the
legislature failed to specify a punishment for the crime of wrongful appropriation as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998), therefore requiring that he be
sentenced to an infraction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105(2) (1999). IcL at 42-44.
Alternatively, he argues that he was entitled to be sentenced under the more specific of
two possible code sections dealing with operable motor vehicles, which section should be
punished as an infraction. Defendant's claim fails on both points.
Defendant was charged with theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, which
provides:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(R. 1) (in Add. D). At defendant's request, the jury was instructed on the lesser included
offense of wrongful appropriation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5, which provides:
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another, without the
consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily
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appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner
or legal custodian of possession of the property.
(R. 29, jury ins. 4) (in Add. A).

In both cases, the jury was instructed that it must find

that the property consisted of an operable motor vehicle (R. 29, jury ins. 3 and 4).
The punishment for theft is set forth in section 76-6-412:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;

(in Add. D). At the time the offense occurred, section 76-6-404.5(3) set forth the
punishment for wrongful appropriation as follows:
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been:
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been
theft is a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation;
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft
is a class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation;
(e) an act of unauthorized control of motor vehicles, trailers, or
semitrailers which does not constitute theft is punishable under Section 41la-131ir
(Emphasis added). Section 41-la-1311 provided:
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized
control over a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer not his own, without the consent
of the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the owner
or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.

35

(in Add. D).
Section 41-la-1311 was repealed, effective May 4, 1998. Defendant committed
the instant offense in July 1998. Section 76-6-404.5(3)(e) remained in effect until it was
repealed by the legislature the following year on May 3, 1999, even though it referred to a
statute no longer in existence. It was during this time that defendant committed the
offense, was charged, and was tried.
The jury rejected the second degree theft charge and convicted defendant of the
lesser offense of wrongful appropriation, a third degree felony (R. 34-35). Defendant
moved to clarify the degree of offense, arguing that he was entitled to be punished for less
than a third degree felony (R. 42-51; 53:4-12). The trial court rejected defendant's claim,
ruling that defendant was convicted and should be punished for a third degree felony
pursuant to section 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (R. 56; 53:13-14) (in Add. E).
On appeal, defendant argues that he should have been sentenced under section 763-105(2) (1999), which provides:

(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly
designated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
(in Add. D). Defendant argues, without supporting authority, that because section 76-6404.5(3)(e) referred to a non-existent code section, there was no penalty specified,
making the offense of which he was convicted-wrongful appropriation of an operable
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motor vehicle-necessarily punishable as an infraction under section 76-3-105(2). Br. of
Aplt. at 44-45. Defendant misinterprets the latter section.
Section 76-3-105 applies to "any offense defined outside this code . . . and for
which no penalty is specified . . . . " Even assuming that no penalty was specified for
wrongful appropriation, as defendant complains, the plain language of section 76-3-105
prevents its application here because defendant was convicted of a crime defined within
the code, and that crime was not specified to be an infraction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6404.5. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to be convicted of an infraction.
Defendant also contends that because section 76-6-404.5(3)(e) deals specifically
with operable motor vehicles, while subsection (3)(a) deals with wrongful appropriation
generally, the former section is "more specific" and should take precedence over the more
general provision. Br. of Aplt. at 43-44. However, the subsections stand in a
greater/lesser relationship, and defendant was convicted, and properly sentenced, under
the greater provision.
"[T]he inquiry of whether one crime is a lesser included offense of a greater crime
under section 76-1-402, turns on the statutorily defined elements of the two crimes. That
is, the court looks to the facts to determine what crime, or variation of the crime, was
proved, but once this determination is made, the court looks to the statutory elements of
the crime to determine whether it is an included offense." State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT
10,116, 994 P.2d 1243, 1247 (quoting State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995)).
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See also State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). Section 76-1-402 provides, in
relevant part, that a crime is a lesser included offense when "[i]t is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged . . . . "
Theft, with which defendant was charged, is the unauthorized control over
another's property with a specific intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. Wrongful
appropriation, of which defendant was convicted, is the exercise of "unauthorized control
over the property of another" with a specific intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1). In
contrast, section 76-6-404.5(3)(e), which defendant seeks to have applied, involves a
lesser included offense of wrongful appropriation. It deals with acts of "unauthorized
control of motor vehicles . . . which do[] not constitute theft...." Utah Code Ann. § 766-404.5(3)(e). No intent requirement is specified, and no additional element is
included.18 Accordingly, guilt of unauthorized control of a motor vehicle under
subsection (3)(e) does not automatically establish guilt of wrongful appropriation-for the
latter, the State had to establish the additional element of the appropriate intent (R. 29,
jury in. 5).
Given that the jury found the requisite intent and convicted defendant of wrongful
appropriation, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant under subsection (3)(a) of

18

While section 41-la-1311(1) included an intent requirement, that section was not
in existence at the time of the instant offense. Accordingly, it does not factor into the
analysis.
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the wrongful appropriation statute, which makes wrongful appropriation of an operable
motor vehicle a third degree felony (R. 29, jury ins. 5, 11, 12).19
Defendant makes an ex post facto argument, claiming that he was entitled to an
infraction upon conviction and that the repeal of subsection (3)(e) before sentencing
unfairly subjected him to a higher third degree felony conviction. Br. of Aplt. at 45.
However, as established above, defendant was exposed to the third degree felony
conviction under subsection (3)(a) when he committed the crime, and the repeal of
subsection (3)(e) did not change the potential punishment for his crime. Accordingly, his
argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J /

day of July, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

19

If this Court deems subsection (3)(e) to be applicable, then defendant is guilty of
no more than a class A misdemeanor under repealed section 41-la-1311. Defendant
agrees with this proposition.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

1998 Supplement

REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B
1995 ED ITIO M

(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the
owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess,
or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of
possession of the property.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control
by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal
custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any
person.
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been:
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is
a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation;
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a
class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation;
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is
ft class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation;
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is
a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; and
(e) an act of unauthorized control of motor vehicles, trailers, or semitrailers which does not constitute theft is punishable under Section
41-la-1311.
History: C. 1M9,7S-S-404.5, enacted by L.
IMS. ch. 13*, I i.
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MR. HEINEMAN:

I don't know see haw it can

3

be against her interest.

4

is stolen, and saying I drove around in that car.

5

It is just a statement, *I drove around in that

6

car."

7

it*

g

not a statement against interest.

9

have the guarantees of trustworthiness that we need

11

If she doesn't know a car

She faces no possible criminal charges for
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It is

It is does not

to haver here.
THF COURT:
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Well, in

12
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13
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14
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15
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17

and more importantly, r think that they * r « rtartesrentsr

18
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19

should say one w a y or the other*

20

A

thoughts from you?

2 I

10

u

L think th*sa> ate. guarantees

I am guessing- the offleer iar going

It seems to me either they are against

21

her interest or they are of no importance at all other

22

than, for example, one might say, "Well, today it looks

23

like it might rain."

24

one way or the other.

25

there is a trustworthy attachment because they are

They have no particular impact
So I think for that reason,

by and large mere statements of inconsequential

1

if taken in the context that you described.

2

meets

3

the other

Clearly

criteria.

And then the last issue you raised,

4

events

the

5

last one I will address is this idea that

6

you were not g i v e n notice so you could prepare

7

meet

8

folks intended to have M s . Gallegos testify if she

9

were willing.

10

i

the evidence.

It is pretty clear that

to

these

So you knew that they wanted her to

make those statements.
opportunity

11

somehow

Clearly you had

to prepare to meet

the

those.

I f tltif are offered in that context then I

12

am going to allow that to be

13

MR. H E I N E M A N :

L4

admitted.

Your Honan* I will, raise

additional objection on confrontation g r o u n d s .

L5
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1:.. theerre^.im. n o w a y we can cross examine heir. ;, She is

L7
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refusing to testify*

L8
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MR. HEINEMAN:
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allowing her to testify without having to
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that violates M r . Webster's confrontation
THE COURT:

13

right.

You have made that for the
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this type of evidence to be
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the jury, they are going to say, "He did it before

and let's send him." I don't see that it adds anythin
to their case.
If she establishes that he took the car
and kept it, what flows from that and his prior
statement of something that occurred in the past,
who k n o w how much years in the past even, doesn't
ad anything to that.
THE COURT*

Any other thoughts, Ms.

Higgina?
BfS- KZGQXKSz

J\i*t gnickLy.

Mr. Heineman

mexttioaad. that we hJLvm shown that he took it and
kept it, fettt I bmLLmvm* their- dmfmnwm ir he didnr^t
kaep it.

He didzL'fc take it to keep it.
THE COURTS

X he>axd the opening statement,

Mr*. H e i n e m m w ha laxind the car in a. pub Lie parking
lot used- bjr JOG ether people*
back track oat mar a time.

8<xr X guttt X wilX

X wilX ha*** to: cone Lu da

based on thj* opexring abatement X ha.va heard,. tha*t
portions that I have seen you want excised, and I am
speaking to Mr. Heineman now, those portions seem to
be to relevant given the opening statement.

In that

context of the opening statement, it seems to me
then it becomes relevant and probative, and the
balancing test becomes more probative than it is

1A

prejudicial.

That would be my conclusion.

glad to put that to rest.

I thank you.

I am

I

appreciate it.
All right, I guess we will wait for Mr.
Webster to go on back with Ms. Gallegos.
MS. HIGGINS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Have any of you have any idea

what the instructions should look like?

Mr.

Heineman, you submitted many.
MR. HEINEMAN:

I submitted many.

I don't

necessarily want to have all of those go to the
jury*
THE COURT: * You, want the lesser included
one?
MR. HEINEMAN:
believe I do.

At this point I don't

Of course, it depends on how the'

total evidentiary picture is at the end, but I am
inclined for all or nothing at this point.
THE COURT:

Okay.

(Off the record discussion)
MR. HEINEMAN:

Your Honor, I do have a

couple of objections to the State's instructions.
First, on the possession of recently stolen property
THE COURT:

I am not into that one at all.

What do you want me to do, Ms. Higgins, just say,

ADDENDUM D

76-8-105. Infractions.
(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
History: C. IMS, 76-3-106, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, | 76-3-106,

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Hietory: C. 1968, 76-4-404, enacted by L.
1973, en. 196, I 1*4404.

764-412* Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages.

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is
less than $5,000;
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery,
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf,
•heep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal
raised for commercial purposes;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less
than $300.
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(lXbXiii), is civilly
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys* fees.
History: C. 1963, 764-412, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, 8 76-6-41*; 1974, ch. 32, i 18;
1976, ch. 46, i 1; 1977, ch. 89, i 1; 1969, ch.
78, f 1; 1966, ch. 291,1 14; 1996, ch. 139, f 1;
1997, ch. 119,1 1; 1997, ch. 289,1 8.

41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accomplice.
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.
I (3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice
[to, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
t;History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch.
M i l ; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, S 1; C. 1943,
PMa-110; L. 1983, ch. 190, § 2; 1986, ch. 31,
• 1; 1967, ch. 92, § 52; C. 1963,41-1-109; repBBiliHiiii by L» 1992, ch. 1, I 168.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 5A
1998 REPLACEMENT

Titles 39 to 46

4 l-la-1311,

41-la-1312.

Repealed.

Repeal*' — Laws 1998, ch. 315, § 2 repeals §
P* — • as renumbered
1
A and
— i last
i—* amended
\~A
Ai-la-l3H*
t L 1992» ch. 1, § 168, concerning exercising
lawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,
, semitrailers, effective May 4, 1998.
U w t l " 3 ' ch. 58, | 2 repeals § 41-la-1312,

as enacted by Laws 1992, ch 1, classifying the
unlawful transfer of a motor vehicle as a Class
A misdemeanor, effective May 3, 1993 For
present comparable provision, see § 41-la711(2).
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MR

1
2

- HEINEMAN:

Which is an act of

unauthorized control of a motor vehicle.

3

THE COURT:

Well, okay.

So you're acquainting

4

the term "wrongful appropriate" to unauthorized control,

5

you're saying those are synonyms?

6

MR. HEINEMAN:

Yes.

Unauthorized control of

7

a motor vehicle, which is tantamount to theft, so he was

8

charged with theft of a motor vehicle.

9

of that, he was convicted of something less than that.

He was acquitted

10 [ It's the unauthorized control of a matox vehicle, and it
1L

tells, via. to. go to 1211...

12
13

THE COURT:

Okay.

that way hut I fallow at? least what you** re* saying,, which,
Okay.

14 J makes me comfortable.
15
16

L actually don l t read it

Anything more I need to

hear?
MR. HEINEMAN:

And if you. dort't read it the

IT

way r read* it-, therr that Just merits her question at the

18

end there, we have to read statutes so that we give

19

effect and meaning to all of their provisions.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think it's not mere

21

(Inaudible), I think it's just a clarification.

The way

22

I read it, 76-6-405.5 (3) (e) is telling us if it were

23

unauthorized control of a motor vehicle, then he'd do it

24

as punished in 1311.

25

in either A, B, C or D, then this is how we punish it.

But if it's wrongful appropriation

1

So I appreciate that in your mind it's mere surplusage,

2

but in my mind, just a clarification of how you would

3

deal with it.

4

it.

5

That's how I read it and that's how I see

So I think that the correct reading of this is

6

the crime for which Mr. Webster was convicted by sub 3,

7

sub a of that section is a third degree felony, so

8

that's how I see that.

9

sentence him.

10

MS. FflGGINS;

Ill

THE COURT:

What do we do next?

We have to

Yea, thank: you.
And I don't know, did you want to

12

respond, to her thoughts*?

13

utmost esteem, SQ; I. — •

14

MR. HErNEMAfrr

15

Tffl& COURT;,

r itteatt r hold you both in the-

My recollection of our

—

I can't think af either of you

16

pulling shenanigans so she's

17

you1 re the Jcindt af guy who does that kind, of stuff,

18

so. . .

19

MR. HEINEMAN:

upset that I don*t think

Well, I have an ethical

20

obligation to represent my client to the fullest of my

21

abilities and I have to raise this matter, even though

22

it appears that it's the Legislature that --

23

THE COURT:

No, no, don't —

24

talking about another thing now.

25

the trap.

no, no, we're

She thought you laid

THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MO: TO CLARIFY DEGREE/CHARGE
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 981201411 FS

KENNETH J WEBSTER,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

MICHAEL K. BURTON
August 24, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindav
Prosecutor: HIGGINS, TRINA
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 19, 1972
Audio
Tape Number:
99 441
Tape, Count;: 4410
CHARGES
2. WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION - 3rd Degree Felony
Disposition.:. 04/29/1999 Guilty
HEARING
DEFT MAKES MOTION TO COURT.
COUNT: 4600
STATE REBUTTAL
COUNT: 5530
COURT ORDERED DEFT WAS CONVICTED OF A THIRD DEGREE FELONY.

Pacre i

#

Case No: 981201411
Date:
Aug 24, 1999
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 165 day(s).
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$750.00
$0.09
$344.59
$750*00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$750.Off
$0
$344.59
$750-00
Plus Interest
The fine is to be paid in full by September 30, 2000.
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
$75.00 PER MONTH BEGINNING 9/30/99
Complete 120 hour(s) o£ community service in lieu of 15 days in
jail.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Murray District Court.
Defendant to serve 15 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine on or before September 30, 2000.
Darro

9

Case No: 981201411
Date:
Aug 24, 1999
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Pay fines and fees as agreed
No Violations of the Law
Evaluation and Treatment as deemed necessary.
NO RESTITUTION DUE ON THIS CASE.
COURT ORDERED 120 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LIEU OF 15 DAYS JAIL.
TO BE COMPLETED AT 20 HOURS PER MONTH AND COMPLETED BY 2/28/2000
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLETE COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING
CLASS/COUNSELING THROUGH VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH.
DEFT TO NOT BE EMPLOYED BY A CAR DEALERSHIP DURING PROBATION
PERIOD.

St
Paae 3 (last)

ADDENDUM F

Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other
reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing
the witnessfromattending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination,
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the
declarant's death was imminent, if the judgefindsit was made in good faith.
(3) Statement against interest A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the tnistworthiness of the statement.
(4) Statement ofpersonal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

ADDENDUM G

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT VT
[Righto of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall eiyoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.}
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

